Removing Compliance: Interpersonal and Social Factors Affecting Insight Assessments by Curk, Polona et al.
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.or
Edited by:
Scott Y. H. Kim,
National Institutes of Health (NIH),
United States
Reviewed by:
Dominic Sisti,
University of Pennsylvania,
United States
Anthony David,
University College London,
United Kingdom
*Correspondence:
Polona Curk
polona.curk@gmail.com
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Public Mental Health,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychiatry
Received: 07 May 2020
Accepted: 17 August 2020
Published: 17 September 2020
Citation:
Curk P, Gurbai S and Freyenhagen F
(2020) Removing Compliance:
Interpersonal and Social Factors
Affecting Insight Assessments.
Front. Psychiatry 11:560039.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2020.560039
POLICY AND PRACTICE REVIEWS
published: 17 September 2020
doi: 10.3389/fpsyt.2020.560039Removing Compliance: Interpersonal
and Social Factors Affecting Insight
Assessments
Polona Curk1*, Sa´ndor Gurbai2,3,4 and Fabian Freyenhagen2,5
1 Independent Researcher, London, United Kingdom, 2 Human Rights Centre, School of Law, University of Essex,
Colchester, United Kingdom, 3 Essex Autonomy Project, School of Philosophy and Art History, University of Essex,
Colchester, United Kingdom, 4 Faculty of Special Needs Education, Institute for Disability and Social Participation, ELTE
Eötvös Lora´nd University, Budapest, Hungary, 5 School of Philosophy and Art History, University of Essex, Colchester,
United Kingdom
This paper probes the format and underlying assumptions of insight conceptualizations
and assessment procedures in psychiatry. It does so with reference to the often-
neglected perspective of the assessed person. It delineates what the mental steps
involved in an insight assessment are for the assessed person, and how they become
affected by the context and dynamics of the clinical setting. The paper examines how
expectations of compliance in insight assessment tools and procedures extend far
beyond treatment adherence, to compliance with diagnostic language and the
assessment relationship. Such compliance can be ethically problematic and not in line
with human rights standards, notably the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities. Most importantly, it can be counterproductive in supporting an individual to
gain better insight in the sense of self-knowledge. The paper concludes with guidelines for
a new approach to insight. This new approach requires taking into account currently
neglected components of insight, in particular its relational and social dimensions, through
which a person’s insight operates and develops, and through which it could be
supported. Concretely, this would mean removing the condition of compliance and
reflecting on the influence of the clinician-patient relationship and assessment situation
on insight.
Keywords: clinical insight, insight assessment, treatment compliance, human rights, therapeutic relationship,
supporting insightINTRODUCTION
Insight is one of the most complex yet influential ideas in psychiatry. Considered clinically relevant
since 19th century, it is mainly in the last three decades that a systematic empirical approach has
developed. A range of definitions of clinical insight and corresponding insight assessment scales has
been proposed (1), and used to examine the thus-defined concept’s correlation to various aspects of
illness, behavior, and personality, such as psychopathology, mood, IQ, and adherence to treatment
(2, 3). The definitions of insight vary from a more narrowly understood awareness of a particular
condition and/or its aspect, to a wider notion encompassing a variety of different types of
judgements about what is happening to the individual [(1) pp. 200-201]. In a vibrant andg September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 5600391
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remain difficult to conceptualize in a consistent way [(1) p. 198].
Nonetheless, as will be shown in the paper, the variety remains
circumscribed within the medical model as the main basis of
understanding the phenomenon of insight.
The current DSM-V mentions impaired insight over 30 times
across various diagnoses, amongst the diagnostic criteria,
illnesses’ “descriptors,” “specifiers,” or “associated features.”
Given how DSM shapes clinical practice, it is reasonable to
conclude that insight is an important clinical variable also in
practice. Nonetheless, there is little research on how the concept
of insight features in routine clinical practices on wards. The
research there is, shows that in clinical settings insight is used
with little detail and specificity [(4), (5) p. 2]. Whilst insight
tools are rarely relied on [(3) p. 1], there is some evidence
that psychiatrists’ accounts of insight are still informed by the
dominant1 psychiatric literature. In one of the rare studies of the
practitioners’ views (6), the interviewed psychiatrists referred to
insight as a “sense of illness,” understood to be related to a kind
of “objective,” “rational,” or “critical” knowledge informed by
psychiatric discourse, which they, in turn, expected the patients
to have or be willing to acquire. Their accounts invariably
constructed insight as proved by treatment compliance2 [(6)
pp. 1462-1464].
Despite not being a legal term, the concept has also played a
central role in mental health and mental capacity legal settings,
where psychiatrists’ views have often had a decisive influence on
outcomes. The term “insight” is mentioned in judicial decisions
in England, Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden, amongst
others (7–9). As Kate Diesfeld has highlighted in a study of
mental health tribunals, liberty- and human rights-affecting
decisions often come down to clinicians’ perceptions on insight
(7). Diesfeld cites studies, which have shown that, (a) in some
cases perceived lack of insight was the only observed symptom
on which the decision at the tribunal hinged, and (b) non-
compliance with treatment was the most frequent justification
for refusing discharge. The concept of insight has also been
relevant in mental capacity settings, such as in England and
Wales’ Court of Protection cases (10, 11). For example, as shown
by Paula Case, expert witnesses—psychiatrists in more than 50%
of cases—frequently import clinical terminology such as of “lack
of insight” and “compliance” into their statements about
assessing not only the diagnostic but also the functional part of
the decision-making capacity.
31The authors of the study point out that the accounts are not in line with the part
of psychiatric literature which is more insistent on working with patients’
experiences and critical of focusing only on symptoms. [(6) p. 1465].
2The study’s authors caution that the results demonstrate psychiatrists’ discourse
rather than what is done in practice.
3By way of context, in England and Wales mental capacity—often known as
mental competency in other jurisdictions like the US—is legally understood in
such a way that showing that a person lacks it in relation to a specific decision at
the material time the decision has to be made, requires showing (a) that the person
suffers from a dysfunction or impairment of the mind or brain (i.e. meets what is
often called the “diagnostic threshold”) and (b) that the person lacks one or more
of four functional decision abilities, such as understanding the relevant
information.
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 2The important role the concept of insight has played in legal
settings has given rise to a number of ethical and human rights-
based concerns. For example, in the above-mentioned study, Case is
concerned that importing clinical terminology into legal settings in a
way that is determinative of legal outcomes, may undermine the
autonomy-promoting provisions of the Mental Capacity Act 2005
[(10) pp. 361-2]. Case may have a point: there is evidence that
psychiatrists understand insight as strongly (2) or even causally (12)
connected to mental capacity, even when they have established only
a correlation between them. The already mentioned study of mental
health tribunals provides another example: it was found that there
was rarely any evidence provided for how impaired insight had been
determined by the clinicians [(7) pp. 362-365].
Some have argued that loose and unspecified use or short-
handing insight for mental capacity is not an intrinsic fault of the
insight concept [(3) p. 2]. But this paper argues that, quite beside the
disagreements about its (unclear) use in legal and medico-legal
settings, certain aspects of current insight conceptualizations and
assessment procedures in both research and clinical practice, may
themselves already be problematic, and looks at why this may be
relevant for the care someone is provided as well as in the human
rights context.
The pervasiveness of the concept indicates that the term insight
captures something important in respect to understanding someone
who seems to have a radically different view of some aspect of their
condition or experience. It can, thus, be a useful construct when
used wisely (3), for example to find the best way for their care [(5) p.
5] But it needs a careful approach and an inclusive understanding of
the phenomena.
The paper makes two main arguments. The first argument is
that underlying assumptions of compliance extend far beyond
treatment adherence, to compliance with medical discourse, and
finally, with the assessment procedure, context, and relationship.
The paper thereby introduces a wider notion of compliance than
is operative in the existing literature. Crucial for this are two
moves the paper makes:
• It highlights how insight, instead of indicating self-knowledge/
self-reflexivity, becomes equated with whether a person complies
with the medical understanding of their experience. This can
illegitimately reduce important ethical and legal decisions to
medical ones. Psychiatric research literature and actors in legal
settings invoke both understandings, and sometimes run them
together in a way that conceals the compliance demands built
into psychiatric conceptualizations and practices, removing
them from the critical scrutiny in light of human rights and
wider ethical standards that they should get. Social and relational
dimensions of a person’s insight are not systematically included,
or not considered at all.
• The paper develops an original analysis of the mental steps
required for the assessed persons in an insight assessment and
how they may be affected by the required compliance with the
context and dynamics of the assessment procedure and
relationship.
The second argument is that as insight understood in the broad
sense of self-knowledge/self-reflexivity can be fundamentallySeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560039
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incompatible with the context of compliance and power asymmetry
in the insight assessment procedure. In other words, the situation of
compliance and asymmetrical power relations is especially
problematic in the context of exploring insight into one’s mental
states and experiences because it can adversely affect it. The paper
argues for a shift of perspective not only in regard to how insight
should be considered—so that the influence of the assessment
interactions is appropriately included in the assessment—but what
assessment of insight can be for—as a basis for support rather than
risk assessment or prevention.
We build on these two arguments to develop suggestions for
how insight could be approached differently. Drawing on a case
vignette, we first illustrate one way in which insight can be
relationally supported, before developing guidelines for such a
support-orientated understanding of insight. We also indicate
that this understanding would better meet human rights
requirements, in particular moving to the supported decision-
making paradigm, than existing conceptualizations and practice.
The paper is structured as follows: the first section briefly
summarizes the existing debates around inclusion of treatment
compliance in insight conceptualizations and scales, and discusses
whether relying on good practice is sufficient to avoid the problems
this inclusion can give rise to. The second section shows that insight
conceptualizations and scales also require compliance with medical
discourse. It exposes an oscillation between the broad and narrow
notion of insight which has problematic implications in terms of
ethics and human rights. In the third section, we analyze the steps
taking place in the insight assessment procedure, to demonstrate
that insight is assessed through an interactive engagement, requiring
mental steps that are dependent on the nature and quality of the
assessment situation, context, and foremost, relationships. Here, too,
the standard approach builds in compliance, as it allows only a
specific configuration of this interaction. The next section presents
insight as an interactive, dynamically negotiated construct. It
provides an example of what supporting insight as self-knowledge
involves. The paper concludes with guidelines.TREATMENT COMPLIANCE
Despite the variety of proposed insight conceptualizations and
scales, there are some common features. Insight is understood as
multidimensional, and its main proposed components can be
summarized as, broadly speaking, (a) an awareness of mental
illness and symptoms, (b) awareness of the need for treatment.
Whilst some scales additionally include (c) understanding the
implications and social impact of the illness, and ability to plan,
and (d) distinguish awareness of symptoms from their attribution
to illness, Ken Kress (13) argues that there are in fact predominantly
only two main dimensions of insight in mental health:
(1) recognition of mental illness and (2) recognition of the need
for treatment. However, the inclusion of (b)—and specifically
treatment compliance as evidence for it—as a component of
insight, has been controversial, both from a conceptual and
epistemological perspectives.Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 3One of the first instruments devised to systematically measure
lack of insight was Item G12 on The Positive and Negative
Syndrome Scale for symptoms of schizophrenia (PANSS),
published in 1987 (14). Item G12 describes seven levels for lack
of insight. The criteria for the penultimate level 6, which describes
lack of insight as “severe,” is that the patient denies ever having had
a psychiatric disorder or symptoms or the need for treatment but is
nonetheless compliant with treatment. It is lack of treatment
compliance that brings one to the top level 7: “extreme” lack of
insight (15). In other words, the scale proposes that if you do not
believe you have a disorder or need medication, it is more insightful
to comply with treatment anyway, than to not comply.
Conceptually speaking, this seems strange. Nonetheless, most
other main scales, such as ITAQ, SAI-E, and SUMD, also give
points for treatment compliance and negative answers will be scored
as lower insight (16–18). On these scales, agreeing to treatment is
always more insightful than not to.
This seems to miss out on capturing the option that, as it seems
intuitively clear, an individual’s views on treatment can be both
positive and negative, and perhaps both, unrelated to insight. For
example, rejecting pharmacological treatments can have other
reasons, such as side effects, wanting to weather things out, trying
alternative treatments, exploring one’s madness, or even liking
certain aspects of it. Rejecting psychotherapy treatments can be
because one does not want to examine something traumatic or
speak about emotions. These can all be at the core of completely
insightful perspectives. One does not have to want to have treatment
to be insightful. Whether having treatment is more insightful can be
a matter of a debate just as whether one should stop smoking, eat
less, exercise more, or follow other health advice.
Perhaps it goes without saying that in practice, or at least in good
practice, the insight assessor will recognize such reasons as insightful
although the instruments themselves do not. However, underneath
hides a neglected presupposition: it is inevitable that it will be the
clinician who makes a distinction between an (insightful) reason for
refusing treatment—say, side effects, which is a recognizable term
and phenomena for the clinician—and a (presumably not
insightful) one, say, that medication is poison (which a trained
psychiatrist might have more difficulties to accept as reasonable).
For example, a clinicianmight judge that it is simply not valid to not
believe in medication, or to not want to take it for no particular
reason at all (despite the fact that some people do not want to stop
smoking without offering any reason for it, and are permitted to do
so). Even in good clinical practice, it is left to the discretion of the
psychiatrist to decide which are valid or invalid reasons. Depending
on the legal safeguards, the discretion of the clinician might be
qualified by the requirement that two clinicians agree, and by the
right to appeal, such as in England, to Mental Health Tribunals. But
the basic point remains: the validity is adjudicated by a clinician or
group of clinicians, at least until challenged by way of legal
review procedures.
Thus, despite the good practices that may go beyond what the
instrument expects, including treatment adherence into insight
conceptualizations remains problematic: it violates one’s right to
decide not only about one’s own treatment, but also about one’s
own values. In the case where the clinician’s view on treatmentSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560039
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detriments in human rights, such as (unjustified) deprivation of
liberty, denial of the right to respect for physical and mental
integrity, or loss of the right to privacy. In addition, some
instances of bad practices and non-accidental risks for such bad
practice are already sufficient for worries regarding human
rights requirements.
Besides conceptually, treatment compliance has been a
contentious component of insight also from epistemological
perspective. Although it has been studied extensively, disagreement
persists: some believe a consensus has been reached that insight is a
predictor of treatment adherence [(3) p. 1], while others claim the
studies produced inconclusive results (1). The relationship between
one’s understanding of one’s experiences and one’s decisions about
treatment is complex. The reasons for the complexity stem partly
from the mind’s different layers of awareness and tendency to allow
for contradictory states and beliefs. As David cautions: “People will
accept and even welcome treatment while still maintaining that they
do not have an illness and vice versa.” (19) Secondly, further
complexity is added by how profoundly and continually we are
influenced by others in our sense-making and our decisions. As
McEvoy et al. recognize, “[it] may be that inpatient compliance
more immediately reflects the socialization of patients to expected
behaviour than any clear recognition of the need for treatment” [(16)
p. 46]. Greenfeld et al. imply that simply what kind of questions have
been asked matters in regard to results in research on insight [(20)
pp. 250-251].
This already points to the importance of the procedure,
context, and relational issues in insight assessments, which we
will turn to further below. But before that, let us look at whether
the issue of compliance is resolved if treatment compliance is
removed from conceptualizations of insight.COMPLIANCE WITH THE MEDICAL
MODEL
In response to qualms about treatment compliance as an insight
component, some have offered alternative approaches. One
proposed solution has been to focus on treatment benefits for
the patient (removing the focus on the acceptance of a particular
diagnosis) (21). However, this brings its own problems, for
example, that the person will not get the right care and support
in the current system, or getting into a kind of “uninformed
consent” dilemma [(22) p. 85]. On the other side, Markova
et al.—concluding that there are no theoretical grounds for
considering treatment compliance intrinsic to the insight concept
[(23) p. 86]—removed items referring to treatment from their 1992
scale (see Table 1 for the features of the main insight scales,
including the Markova et al.’s one).
When we remove the treatment compliance component from
insight assessment, the focus turns to the awareness of illness.
Markova et al.’s new scale focuses on individual’s experiences.
Nonetheless, requiring explicit agreement with the idea of illness
is still there. Scoring points for insight requires agreement with
statements such as “I am ill” and disagreement with statementsFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 4such as “There is nothing wrong with me” [(23) p. 87]. Other
scales frame the awareness in even more explicitly medical terms:“1. At the time of admission to this hospital, did you
have mental (nerve, worry) problems that were different
from most other people’s? Explain.” [(16) p. 47]
“2a. Ask patient: ‘Do you think you have an illness?’”
proceeding to:
“2b. Ask patient: ‘Do you think you have a mental/
psychiatric illness?’” proceeding to:
“2c. Ask patient: ‘How do you explain your illness?’”
[(17) p. 806]
“1. In the most general terms, does the subject believe
that he/she has a mental disorder, psychiatric problem,
emotional difficulty, etc.?” [(18) p. 879]The scales differ in the terminology, referring to mental illness,
disorder, mental worry, psychiatric condition, and other. However,
all above-mentioned scales give points for insight when the
individual in question endorses having an illness and/or agrees
with the diagnosis. The issue of expecting compliance in relation to
insight turns out to be wider than one might have thought.
It is clear from the above that the most frequently used insight
scales need a diagnosis for the assessment to make sense. First, a
presence of symptoms is established and a diagnosis given, then the
individual’s appreciation of their experiences is examined. The
instruments do not aim to assess whether one is mentally ill: they
expect that to be a given.
As a result, the scales are insensitive to distinguishing between
healthy control groups and people with mental illness. As David
et al. [(24) p. 1384] put it: “…asking a self-aware healthy person to
perform the metacognitive task of saying whether they suffer from a
mental illness or symptoms thereof should lead to an emphatic ‘no’,
while the patient with SCZ who lacks all insight into their condition
will give the same response, with the same certainty.” Beck
Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) (25) attempted to remedy this by
proposing “cognitive insight,” which refers to one’s ability to
evaluate and correct one’s beliefs through the sub-scales of self-
reflectiveness and self-certainty. However, as David et al. (24) note,
BCIS still refers to unusual experiences, which not all might have (or
consider “unusual”). In sum, if there is not a prior diagnosis, or
judgment of there something being wrong, pathological, or at least
“unusual,” insight instruments do not make sense.
This might still not seem problematic, unless one wants to
problematize psychiatric diagnoses in the first place, which is not
what is attempted here. However, even if the relevant conclusions
about clinical insight are “as close to being ‘facts’ as anything else in
the clinical psychiatry” (3), the issue that insight scales do not make
sense without diagnosis exposes problems with their underlying
conceptualization of insight.
As a quick detour to help elucidate this, let us look at the use
of the word “insight” in Court of Protection cases. It shows not
only that the concept is used both in clinical and generic (non-
clinical) senses of the word, but also it is not always possible to
determine whether clinicians and judges are referring to clinicalSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560039
Curk et al. Removing ComplianceTABLE 1 | Features of the main insight scales and issues of concern.
Insight
instrument
Features of the instrument Issues of concern
Item G12 on the
Positive and
negative
syndrome scale
for schizophrenia
(PANSS) (14)
1) Definition/components:
Lack of insight is defined as
• impaired understanding of one’s own
psychiatric condition and life situation
• failure to recognize psychiatric illness or
symptoms,
• denial of need for hospitalization and
treatment
• poor anticipation of consequences and
unrealistic planning
Seven levels of severity of lack of insight. Denial of
psychiatric illness or symptoms and denial of
need for hospitalization and treatment are
considered as severe lack of insight; refusal of
medication is considered an extreme lack of
insight.
2) Attitude in relation to both past and present
experiences are considered.
Being rated as having insight requires acceptance of psychiatric discourse, medical treatment,
and cooperation with therapists.
The paper accompanying the scale judges disagreement with the clinician and hostility towards
her/him, sarcasm, uncooperativeness, or disrespect, as part of pathology.
The instrument does not take into account that some of the items measured (for example,
tension, anxiety, etc.) may be partly a result of the interview situation itself rather than pathology.
It does not account for socio-cultural background, or require self-reflexivity on the part of the
clinicians such as about social distance to the patient and the quality of the relationship.
Treatment refers to hospitalization and psychiatric treatment only.
Explaining the need for treatment in relation to other (non-psychiatric) problems, such as anxiety,
tension, or sleep difficulty, is considered “rationalization.” Only full acceptance of the psychiatric
model is considered insightful.
Denying illness but taking medication anyway is rated as more insightful than denying illness and
refusing medication.
Insight and
Treatment
Attitudes
Questionnaire
(ITAQ) (16)
1) The insight questionnaire tries to establish:
• Recognition of mental problems
• Recognition of need for hospitalization
• Recognition of the need for treatment with
medication
• Recognition of vulnerability to recurrence of
problems
• Attitude to medication and intent to take it
after discharge
2) The scale asks about mental problems, need
for hospitalization, and need for medication in
relation to past and present experience, and in
relation to the future.
3) The scale asks the person for an explanation in
relation to their answers.
Being rated as having insight requires that the patient judges their experience as pathological in
a manner congruent with the clinicians and that they believe they need treatment.
Treatment refers to hospitalization and pharmacotherapy only.
The instrument does not account for socio-cultural background, or require self-reflexivity on the
part of the clinicians such as about social distance to the patient and the quality of the
relationship.
Schedule for the
Assessment of
Insight (SAI) (17)
1) Insight has three components:
• Recognition of mental illness
• Compliance with treatment (passive and
active)
• Ability to attribute symptoms to illnessThe
three dimensions are overlapping.
Insight can be partial.
2) If an explanation of illness is given that is
considered appropriate to the socio-cultural and
educational background, points for insight can be
given.
3) Treatment refers also to other physical and
psychological therapies.
Being rated as having insight requires acceptance of having a (psychiatric) illness, acceptance of
treatment, and attribution of experiences to illness.
The scale advises that an appropriate explanation for illness given the person’s socio-cultural
and educational background can be considered fully insightful, including, for example, stress,
family history, etc. However, in the next section, if a particular experience is understood as a
reaction to outside events, such as stress, tiredness, etc., this is considered only partially
insightful. Full insight is only established if a medical view is adopted by the person in full.
It does not require self-reflexivity on the part of the clinicians such as about social distance to
the patient and the quality of the relationship.
Scale to Assess
Unawareness of
Mental Disorder
(SUMD) (18)
1) The scale has a 17-item symptoms list to be
completed prior to the scale.
The scale consists of three summary items:
• Awareness of mental disorder/psychiatric
problem
• Awareness of the achieved effects of
medication
• Awareness of the social consequences of
the mental disorder
After that, awareness and attribution of the
relevant ones from the 17 symptoms are
Being rated as having insight requires acceptance of psychiatric discourse.
Treatment refers to medication only.
If the person believes the medication has not lessened their symptoms, they are considered
unaware. No other belief or explanation in regard to treatment is considered.
Although in the accompanying paper the authors recognize that what constitutes a sign or
symptom of a mental disorder may vary widely from one culture or subculture to another, this is
not reflected in the scale and is (presumably) left to the clinician’s opinion.
(Continued)Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 5600395
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impairment or needs, which might be considered as referring
directly to “clinical insight,” the term is also used to refer to:
• P’s insight into others’ needs;
• P’s insight into effects of P’s actions on others;
• P’s insight into her personal relationships;
• P’s insight into P’s own personality traits and talents;
All these are not usually part of insight assessments. In
addition, the term insight has even been used in court in
reference to the carer’s understanding of P’s needs (26–30).
This signals that there are two notions of insight in play in
psychiatric research and practice as well as legal settings. As
mentioned at the beginning, the conceptualizations of insight
range from a narrower awareness of particular aspect of illness to
a wider idea of self-knowledge. For the sake of clarity, Table 2
provides orientating definitions of the two notions of insight.
There is a crucial move at the basis of insight conceptualizations
in psychiatry, through which insight (which in the case of a carer
above, for example, would simply describe how she understands her
charge’s needs) becomes equated exclusively with whether a person
agrees with the medical understanding of their experience.4For example, Markova, slightly differently, proposes distinguishing between a
wider notion of insight as a phenomenon and the clinical concept of insight that
Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 6Let us consider a few examples to help explain why this is
problematic. This is a recent statement in a paper that defends
insight conceptualizations in psychiatry:conce“Insight is another word for self-knowledge and it may
even have a dedicated brain system for its implementation.
It is more about a conversation we have with ourselves
about what we truly believe than the opinion of others.
Acknowledging that one is ill or impaired or in need of
help is never easy but, we contend, it is necessary for living
an authentic life.” [(3) p. 2].First, insight is equated with self-knowledge; then, there is an
implicit shift from the broad notion of insight (self-knowledge)
in the first sentence to the narrow notion (awareness of illness or
impairment); and, finally, this narrow notion is linked with an
ethical value (authenticity) that is not directly linked to medicine.
One might think that a shift from the broad notion of insight to
the narrow one is innocent and natural, given the context. When
self-knowledge might include a number of dimensions, one might
think the dimension that is relevant in the context of psychiatry—
and in the related legal settings—is about self-knowledge about
one’s mental illness or impairment4. Many have expressed concerns
that the scales then essentially measure a discrepancy between the
assessed individual and the clinician (5, 31) or in relation to a “gold
standard” (24), a concern discussed in relation to insight since
Jasper’s and Lewis’s definitions of “correct” attitudes and judgments
[(17) p. 799] [(32) p. 333]. It may also be methodologically suspect:TABLE 1 | Continued
Insight
instrument
Features of the instrument Issues of concern
assessed. Insight can be partial.
Insight is “modality-specific”: it can vary across
various manifestations of the illness and can be
present in relation to a particular symptom but
not another.
2) Awareness of each item and symptom is
assessed in relation to the current experience and
to past episodes.
The scale does not require self-reflexivity on the part of the clinicians such as about social
distance to the patient and the quality of the relationship.
Insight in
Psychosis
Questionnaire/
Insight Scale (IS)
(23)
1) Insight is described in relation to an experience
of change:
• Experience of change
• Domain of perceived change (within the self,
the environment, or both)
• Focus of change (thoughts, feelings, etc.)
• Attributing the perceived changes to illness
Practically oriented—the scale is based on a
wider concept of insight as self-knowledge,
knowledge of the illness and how it might affect
his/her ability to function within the environment.
It focuses on the subjective experience of the
patient and his/her relationship to the
environment, rather than diagnosis or labeling.
2) Items relating to views about hospitalization or
medication were deleted in the new version.
Although the references to the need for treatment and hospitalizations were removed, the scale
still scores points for insight on the basis of admitting that one is “ill,” there is something
“wrong,” and one feels different from “normal.”
Attributing experiences to “feeling tired” or similar are not scored as insightful.
The scale does not account for socio-cultural background, or require self-reflexivity on the part
of the clinicians such as about social distance to the patient and the quality of the relationship.rns only a small section of it (1).TABLE 2 | Two notions of insight.
Narrow
notion of
insight
Insight is a matter of awareness of illness (or impairment), where what
counts as illness (and impairment) is, ultimately, understood in terms
of the medical model.
Broad
notion of
insight
Insight is a matter of self-knowledge, where what counts as self-
knowledge is, ultimately, understood in terms of the level of self-
reflexivity a person has about their experiences and conditions.September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560039
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person making the measurement. As Guidry-Grimes and others
have pointed out, it is also problematic because of the power
imbalance between the clinician and patient (5), inconsistent or
inconclusive results in insight research for example in relation to
treatment adherence (1, 5), cognition (33), and certain psychiatric
conditions (5); and simply because psychiatry is not infallible (5).
Despite these concerns, it might be considered completely legitimate
for people highly trained in a specialist body of knowledge to assess
whether a lay person complies sufficiently with the gold standard
produced by this body of knowledge.
Even if so, the problem we highlight remains. Independently
of the standard of correctness for this discipline, the nature of
mental illness, or psychiatry as a medical science, there are
compliance assumptions underlying the psychiatric insight
concept coming from the conflation of the two notions of
insight. The main and explicit operative notion in psychiatric
research and practice is the narrow one (as shown above, the
insight instruments need a diagnosis for the assessment to make
sense). However, this notion is used alongside the broad notion
of insight and sometimes conflated with it. It is the broad notion
that not only covers up the compliance requirement in the
narrow notion but gives the concept its weight in legal and
medico-legal settings.
This is most clearly visible at the intersection of psychiatry and
law. In the context of mental health tribunals and courts deciding
about mental capacity, it is reasonable to suppose that it would
make a significant difference if instead of psychiatrists’ stating that
the persons in question lack insight, such statements were
disambiguated to say solely that the persons are not complying
with the treatment recommendations or discourse or assessment
situation derived from the medical model of psychiatry. Such a
disambiguated statement might still be relevant and useful for
tribunals and courts, but it is reasonable to expect that it would
not be as decisive in determining the legal fate of the individuals in
question than stating that they lacked insight (something that, as
noted in the Introduction, is often the sole decisive factor). The latter
statement might be easily misunderstood to be a claim about their
general capacity for self-knowledge and self-reflexivity, which
includes other considerations (such as, for example, authenticity
of life or what is necessary for it), outside of medical or psychiatric
matters. Instead of drawing attention to the reasons why a person
might not comply with medical treatment, discourse, and
assessment relation, a statement about insight that is not
disambiguated between the narrow and broad notion of insight
might settle important legal and ethical matters by way of an
equivocation, such that the expert witness is warranted only to
speak of the narrow notion of insight, but is understood to invoke
the broad one.
Therefore, it these instruments are to be considered “insight
assessment scales”—then they should be valid and working for
anyone whose insight into their mental states and experiences can
be assessed, regardless of what these mental states and experiences
are—so, also for people without a diagnosis or illness. Insight
would simply mean a reflection on one’s own mental processes
(or indeed, as in the case of the carer, above, another’s mentalFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 7processes): that is, referring to (self-) knowledge. Assessing a
person’s, or a patient population’s, reflexivity and understanding
of their experiences might then be primarily an exploratory rather
than evaluative endeavor—”how do they understand them?”
If they are, on the contrary, instruments to measure how
much or how little a patient accepts they have an illness in a
medical sense for which a medical treatment is the only or
most appropriate, then they are, rather, “agreement with
medical view assessment scales”. In this second case, a) these
assessment scales do indeed need a diagnosis prior to the
assessment (otherwise there is nothing to measure the
agreement with), but it needs to be taken into account that
b) you cannot score high on the “agreement with medical view
scale” if you disagree.
If the scales were actually referring to self-reflexivity/self-
knowledge (insight in the broad sense), they would work for
anyone whose insight can be measured. In contrast, the
underlying conceptualization of insight of existing insight
instruments is based on conflation that uses a concept that
implies one understanding (self-knowledge) but in fact refers
to a narrower notion (measuring whether the person accepts the
medical understanding of their experience). This is a conceptual
problem with the scales that is mostly independent of what we
think about the nature of mental illness, or the validity of
the diagnosis.
This problem touches on ethics and human rights, once we take
into account how the medical model often diverges from other
approaches to mental difficulties, while ethics and human rights
require considerable respect for the other approaches. As some of
the recent literature highlights, both insight as a phenomenon and
its assessment are strongly influenced by socio-cultural factors. A
study of triads (patient, family member, clinician) by Tranulis et al.
(31) has shown that when comparing the patient’s insight into their
condition with a family member’s insight into the patient’s illness,
they were very closely correlated although the latter were not
suffering from illness. Both patients and their entourage were
creating explanations for the experiences using their shared
background, life experiences, and views on stigma: In Western
participants, meanings were constructed around stress, drugs,
overwork, whilst immigrant participants spoke about spiritual
forces and religion. The authors conclude that “[e]xplanations
congruent with the person’s culture should be accepted as
evidence of good insight” [(31) p. 238].
There are some important acknowledgments in the insight
scales literature of the influence of socio-cultural factors on
insight. The authors of SUMD speak about the consistency of
the patient’s views with his/her culture [(18) p. 874] and the SAI
scale refers to the plausibility of the patient’s beliefs in relation to
their socio-cultural milieu (17). However, first, what is
considered “plausible” is left to the clinician, and second, it is
unclear what happens when this milieu includes something that
the clinician does not believe in. There are no guidelines in the
procedure about how such beliefs are to be taken into account.
Perhaps the expectation is to educate the patient towards medical
explanations, as the study of psychiatrists’ account of insight
mentioned above suggests (6).September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560039
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could be more inclusive, for example, a simple recognition that
one has problems which affect one’s interpersonal relations and
will likely continue without treatment adherence [(22) p. 88], or an
acknowledgment of some kind of change in the self that affects
social functioning and feeling the need for restitution, but
“irrespective of the attribution and the pathways of care that the
person seeks,” [(34) p. 108]. However, despite these views,
systematically and consistently considering insight as irrespective
of attribution of experiences to mental illness, inclusive of other
explanatory models, and recognizing as insightful also a person
seeking non-medical treatments, seems the opposite of what the
dominant conceptualizations of insight and scales allow.
Thus, whilst mental health professionals and researchers may
agree about the importance of the socio-cultural factors and
declare to be open to other pathways of care, it is unclear that this
happens systematically in practice. As with recognition of need
for treatment (above), the validity of views diverging from the
medical model is adjudicated by clinicians. Ultimately, we are
faced with another instance of compliance.
This is important in relation to biases that some report in studies
on insight (as measured by insight scales) in relation to social and
demographical factors [(1) pp. 78-83]. Moreover Tranulis et al.’s
study found evidence that the social distance between the
background of clinicians and patients led to clinicians more
readily treating certain patients pharmacologically because they
felt uncomfortable engaging with the beliefs and ideas of those
patients [(31) pp. 228, 234-237]. This suggests that, despite some
important mentions of socio-cultural diversity in the literature, the
demand for compliance with the medical model built into the scales
remains problematic from legal and ethical perspectives.
In the ethical and human rights context in which medical
(including psychiatric) care operates, it is widely recognized (at
least in liberal jurisdictions) that the best interests of a person are
not exhausted by what is medically in their best interests. Thus,
even if medically trained professionals are typically best suited to
judge what is in a person’s medical best interests, this does not
settle the question of what is in their overall best interests.
Settling this question is not something that medically trained
professionals have specific expertise in and, more importantly,
their training and expertise gives them no special authority in
relation to this wider issue. Moreover, the value of autonomy also
comes into the equation: the person should be allowed to
determine what happens, even when they are not choosing the
course of action in their best interests (both medical and overall
best interest), as long as they are mentally competent (which is a
necessary and perhaps sufficient condition for autonomy).
More recent developments—notably the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)
—have affirmed that the rights in question should also apply to
persons with disabilities and that any restrictions in these rights
should be disability-neutral (i.e., made on a basis that applies to
every person, irrespective of disabilities). Otherwise, these
restrictions would be discriminatory.
Thus, if lack of insight is accepted as a ground on the basis of
which it would be ethically permissible and compatible withFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 8human rights requirements to restrict the rights of the person in
question, it would have to be the broad notion. Moreover, any
assessment of it would have to be extended to everyone, not
restricted to groups of protected characteristics, such as people
with mental illness. Psychiatric notions of insight, since they
depend on a diagnosis and are not valid for healthy controls,
would therefore be excluded, otherwise there would be concerns
about direct discrimination. This has nothing to do with
epistemic worries about psychiatry. Instead, it is due to the fact
that compliance with the medical model of psychiatry is not
something that can be legitimately required of people when it
comes to any restrictions of their individual rights for their
own good.
Modern liberal ethics and human rights require that such
restrictions and indeed any safeguarding deployed to ensure that
autonomy is in place be based on reasons that the person can
endorse, thereby respecting their rights, will and preferences
[(35) p. §12(4)] Psychiatry’s views on how a person understands
herself do not by themselves settle that the person takes them as
determinative of, or necessary for, what counts as self-knowledge
and self-reflexivity. Whilst the judgment whether a person is
compliant with medical discourse is something that would be
permissible to report to courts and tribunals, the question of
whether or not this means that the person lacks insight in
the broad sense, would have to be left open by psychiatric
expert witnesses.COMPLIANCE WITH THE ASSESSMENT
RELATIONSHIP
One might ask how one could assess someone’s insight without
judging it against the (medical) mode of the clinician, or some
accepted “correct” or “gold” standard. We hope to provide some
answers in the rest of this paper.
One answer might be, as we saw above, to include the ratings by
a caregiver or family member. David et al. (24) caution that this
poses a similar problem of a gold standard, but note that the
methodology is consistent in showing lower estimate of deficit by
patients in comparison to caregivers. Whilst certainly a valuable
methodology, even when a person’s view of their experiences or
needing help differs from that of their family or peers, this is not
conclusive about someone’s lack of insight. The methodology of
simply looking for discrepancy is not sensitive to potential
mediating variables, for example, emotional motivations of each
of these groups behind their estimates, such as tiredness of the care
givers, their risk aversion in comparison to the patients’ one, their
sense of responsibility, etc.
This highlights another presupposition that the existing
insight conceptualizations and scales share: that insight is
something intrapersonal. Whilst it can have among its
generative conditions socio-cultural factors, none of the
assessment methods explicitly factors in the relational dynamic
of insight assessments. For example, none include mechanisms for
self-reflexivity on the side of the assessor about how confounding
factors (such as social distance or the interpersonal dynamics, orSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560039
5For a good account of holding subjective beliefs that give meaning and enable our
“cultural” existence, and exist in the paradox of simultaneously not to be
questioned but also not to be imposed on the others, see (36).
6Not only in a vulnerable person but in most people. Clare Lamontagne gives an
example of how an intimidating supervisor adversely affects nurses’ thinking and
creates confusion in administering medication. [(37) p. 59]. Reyes et al. (38) show
that stress in the form of interpersonal challenge decreases metacognitive
sensitivity.
7See, for example, Bowles and Sharman (39) and Perlman et al. (40) on the effects
of using leading interview questions in court with vulnerable adults.
Curk et al. Removing Complianceother differences mentioned above) might have influenced
the findings.
And yet, the terms used in relation to insight assessments, such as
“agrees with,” “complies with,” “comparing to,” highlight that insight
has a relational dimension which the individual-centered term
“awareness of illness” obscures: insight is not simple intrapersonal
“self-knowledge”; it is assessed within an interpersonal and social
setting, through an interaction, which affects and co-constructs the
phenomenon that is being examined.
This becomes clearer if we unpack the way insight is assessed,
whether with insight scales in research or informally in clinical
practice. “Assessment of insight” seems an incomplete description
for what actually takes place. A better description is: establishing the
nature of the awareness through communication between the
individual and the clinician. Indeed, both McEvoy et al. [(16) p.
43] and David [(17) p. 799] quote Eskey’s 1958 definition of insight
as “the presence of verbalized awareness…” (emphasis added). We
can extend the term “verbalized” here to include other kinds of
communication, but because another’s insight is something that can
only be established through communication, what is, misleadingly,
simply termed “awareness”must include a number of steps in order
for the person to be deemed to have insight by another person:
Step 1 A recognition—crossing the threshold of consciousness
—about something in one’s experiences (inner self-awareness);
Step 2 Making sense of the available labels and descriptions
that the clinical care team presents (cognitive capacity and socio-
cultural background);
Step 3 Connecting the labels to the experiences in oneself and
understanding the implications (self-reflexivity, and accepting a
view of oneself as in grip of some undesirable characteristic);
Step 4 Acknowledgment of this connection in front of the
clinician/care team, that is, publicly (interpersonally) accepting
the connection between the experience and its medical
definition (accepting the other’s view of oneself as in grip of
some undesirable characteristic).
Each of these steps is required in order for the clinician to
establish an existence of “awareness.” The steps show insight is
embedded in interpersonal dynamics, dependent on trust, open
communication, power balance, negotiation of language. They
reveal that we currently call the patient’s “awareness of illness” is
in effect already in some sense compliance: with a particular medical
discourse presented to her as already noted above; but also with the
assessment situation (the procedure, the context, the way the clinical
team relate to her and describe her experience and its implications).
None of the insight assessment tools has an in-built mechanism that
would consider the influence of the interpersonal dynamics on how
someone makes sense of their mental (ill)health.
Consider the instructions in the paper introducing the PANSS
scale. It advises on the assessment procedure as follows: a semi-
structured clinical interview (supplemented on some of the items, but
not G12, by reports of either primary care staff or family) elicits dataFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 9from the patient, which is then applied by the clinician to the 30-item
form. The interview is to be, on instructions by the authors, at first
“nondirective, unchallenging,” in order to establish rapport with the
patient, but already in the second phase they advise the interviewer to
continue with leading questions, at first “unprovocative” but then
directly suggestive, such as “Do you have special or unusual powers?
…Are you on a special mission fromGod?”The interview culminates
in phase four that, the paper instructs, requires an even more
“directive and forceful probing of areas where the patient appeared
defensive, ambivalent, or uncooperative.” If the patient has avoided
forthright acknowledgment of psychiatric disorder they are to be
subjected to “greater stress and testing of limits…” and their
“susceptibility to disorganization” explored [(14) p. 263]. This
procedure, the authors argue, will enable the observation of,
amongst other things, tension, poor rapport, uncooperativeness and
hostility, cognitive disorganization, lack of flow of conversation, and
anxiety, considered as some of the symptoms of schizophrenia.
It is disconcerting that PANSS procedure instructs a vulnerable
person is to be subjected to “directive and forceful probing,” “greater
stress and testing of limits…” and test of “susceptibility to
disorganization.” First, the sought after “symptoms” such as poor
rapport, tension, uncooperativeness, hostility, anxiety, or even, in
extreme cases, cognitive disorganization, might be an expected
response to such interpersonal stress. Second, submitting only
individuals whom we perceive to have an impairment, to
stringent tests about their beliefs, with the consequence of
potentially coercing them into something, is problematic from
human rights perspective. We all operate with certain beliefs in
the background of our thinking, which not all others would share5.
Most importantly, such approach is counterproductive in terms of
assessing insight, as it affects one’s ability to think and reflect6.
Finally, using leading questions to elicit purported evidence, in this
case about lack of insight, is also problematic practice from research
and legal perspectives7. Item G12 on PANSS is amongst the most
frequently used insight assessment tools in psychiatric research
(1, 41).
Is there a general problem with probing questions or could
the instrument simply be deployed in a better, more sensitive
way? Let us first look at an important point about the influence of
a particular trait’s desirability on the tendency for a person to
admit to owning this trait (24), before we return to how probing
questions could be used in the vignette in the next section.
Studies often try to get around the trait desirability influence by
using third person vignettes, and/or scenarios where admitting a
psychiatric problem brings the protagonist some kind of
(financial) benefit. Despite this way around, however, in theSeptember 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560039
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the benefits of admitting to mental illness than participants with
a diagnosis. The authors consider that a genuine inability of the
people with the disorder to accurately reflect on one’s condition
and/or a bias in the appraisal of material might be behind this.
However, it may also be that it is easier for healthy controls to see
the benefit of admitting to something that they know is not
(currently) true about themselves, than for someone to whom the
situation strikes too close to home. In other words, precisely the
reluctance to admit might, in this case, be signaling the
admission, indicating, for example, an internal conflict between
the above Steps 3 and 4.
This reluctance might suggest, that the factor of dealing with
stigma is affecting insight, as argued by Lysaker et al. (42). But it
might also reflect something about the relationship to the assessors
of insight. Even if an individual is internally aware there is
something “wrong,” she might not want to own this up to the
particular assessor (such as a stranger who is conducting insight
research) or agree with their approach (such as a forceful probing
one). Indeed, they might not be willing to “confess” that
something is wrong to a medical practitioner but prefer lay
persons of trust in their environment. In order that one can
accept the other as someone who one is able to acknowledge things
to, share, even answer to, there has to be a good relationship.
Reluctance may, thus, reflect the quality of the relationship, not the
level of insight. Indeed, which level of insight someone might
be able to attain can depend on the nature and quality of
this relationship.
Bearing in mind the above steps, particularly Step 4, someone’s
insight is at least partly a product of a relational negotiation process,
in which both the individual and the clinician are trying to make
sense of that individual’s experience and needs. But the standard
insight assessment situation projects an asymmetrical power
relationship between the assessor and the assessed individual,
whether in research or clinical practice context, which can skew
the negotiation process. It prevents conditions that exactly underpin
and enable insight, such as exploration, discovery, risk taking,
testing of possibilities, time, trust. It can create resistance rather
than trust and puts at the core of insight evaluation disagreement.
Perceived disempowerment, resistance to coercion, and rejecting
attempts to undermine their self-concept have been identified as
some of the reasons why people reject medication [(6) p. 1464]. As
Amador and Kronengold describe, disagreement can create mutual
frustration, and the individual may refuse the treatment or accept it
only in order to gain back their freedom. This is not specific to
people with mental impairment or vulnerability; it is, the authors
recognize, “what any of us would do” [(41) p. 3].
The problem of compliance is thus not yet resolved by
removing treatment compliance from the insight scales; and
not even by development of assessment methods that are not
focused on acceptance of psychiatric language. There is an issue
of compliance in the standard assessment situation itself, as
summed up above in Step 4 of the assessment. This is not to
suggest that it is psychiatry’s intention or aim to intimidate or
control, but that it may be creating conditions with its conceptual
models and procedures, where this can easily and inadvertentlyFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 10happen. As the authors of the study of psychiatrists’ accounts of
insight put it: “We do not claim that the imposition of the
medical perspective is done with the explicit goal of imposing it.
Rather, it results from what could be termed the ‘professional
habitus’ of the doctor, which invests the doctor with the power to
impose his or her perspective” [(6) p. 1465].
In order to be able to properly understand their patients’
making sense of their experiences, a more equal relationship is
required. Thus, the assessor might also have to rate themselves,
their approach, the quality of their relationship to their patient,
their own and patient’s social positions: variables that do
not currently appear in research on insight. In other words,
the assessment of someone’s self-reflexivity such as required by
insight would need to include the assessor’s own self-reflexivity,
in particular about how they might be influencing the very thing
they are trying to measure.
The recent human rights conventions would permit the person
some leeway in rejecting who will assess them and how. The CRPD
and the ethical idea of autonomy for example, do grant persons—
including persons with disabilities, where this includes mental
illness and impairments—a say in how, where and by whom
certain safeguarding procedures are implemented. Also, research
context might be a slightly different case in that insight assessments
are entered into voluntarily and research ethics requires that
safeguards are in place. Nonetheless, as noted in the Introduction,
the results from research inform classification and diagnosis of
mental illness and will bear on the fate of people who did not
themselves consent to be a research subject. It is arguably reasonable
to require that there are further checks and balances built in. For
example, Freyenhagen and O’Shea have argued that classification of
mental illness should not be just left to the medical profession—
because the issues at hand are not just medical but concern values
about which people can reasonably disagree—but any such
decisions should be scrutinized also by democratic institutions in
which experts by experience should be given voice (43). Similarly,
the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the right to health has called on all
states to take “immediate measures to establish inclusive and
meaningful participatory frameworks in the design of and
decision-making around public policy” on mental health, in
which service users and those in the most vulnerable situations
are given a voice [(44) p. §92(a)].
We have argued in this section that it is not enough to consider
that insight has been influenced by a socio-cultural context, but that
it continues to be formed in myriad of social interactions and
conditions, including during the insight assessment. This is
something that even more inclusive notions of insight in the
literature do not accurately capture. There are, broadly speaking,
two main strands of insight research in psychiatry, one focusing on
failures of metacognition (how a person is able to incorporate new
knowledge about their abilities or deficits into their awareness
of illness) (24), the other one advocating a wider approach to
understanding insight (including factors such as ability to cope with
stigma, social cognition and socio-cultural background) (1, 42).
Both of them understand insight as something pertaining
exclusively to the individual herself; they conceptualize insight
“in … intrapersonal terms” [(3) p. 2].September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560039
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dynamically negotiated construct.INSIGHT CONSTRUCTED RELATIONALLY
A good therapeutic relationship is one of the factors consistently
seen as influencing better treatment adherence, less severe
symptoms, better social functioning, and fewer hospital
admissions [(45) p. 517]. Psychoanalytic literature shows that
positive emotional relationship with the clinician improves
insight in at least some patients with psychosis (46, 47).
Without a good therapeutic alliance, improved “insight” has
been seen to come with the accompanying risk of deteriorating
mood and quality of life of the patients, or ensuing depression
(48, 49). Guidry-Grimes indicates that one reason to give more
attention to insight assessments is so that more effective
strategies for supporting therapeutic alliance can be suggested,
this in turn leading to better goals of care [(5) p. 5].
In a sense, a good therapeutic alliance is similar to, and can
perhaps be considered part of, supported decision-making. It is a
relationship of trust rather than undue influence; it tries to empower
rather than resort to best interest or substituted decision-making; to
enable and support the person concerned to exercise their right to
self-determination, to support someone to make their own
decisions. This might include, for example, helping them think
through their experiences, or identify their will and preferences,
crucial to human rights requirements (35). This can happen
through a relationship of mutual respect, where the clinician, too,
can learn from the collaboration.
Aspects of the patient’s insight into particular experiences are
interactively, dynamically constructed in everyday negotiations.
For example, in anorexia, questions such as “Have I eaten
enough?” “What is enough?” “Should I do less exercise?” “How
do I feel whether it was too much exercise?” “Which situations
make me compulsively walk?” “What social role does eating have
for me?” etc., are discussed, interpreted with, and negotiated
between the patient and the team, and other family members.
Other explanations beside illness (“perhaps I am just naturally
slim,” “I am strong enough to walk”) are tried, tested, sometimes
defensively demonstrated, corrected. These negotiations may
represent the input through which the clinician’s views of the
patient’s insight develop. But importantly, these negotiations
whilst affecting aspects of the patient’s insight, are also aspects of
their relationship to the clinician. That means that the patient’s
insight is a function, amongst other things, of this relationship.
Often, patients are prepared to adhere to treatment and even to
get better for their clinicians, and for the sake of their
relationship, which they value. They eat if the clinician sits
with them. They agree to face the anxiety of something,
because a team member tries it with them. It might help them
believe in the process if they feel the clinicians believe in them. It
gives them an impetus to engage with the difficulties of the
process. When at least some part of someone’s mental health
difficulties might plausibly be considered to stem from their
social and interpersonal circumstances, the relationship withFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 11their clinician is an opportunity for a better, more supported
experience, including better ways to think about them.
It is worth considering how clinician’s self-reflexivity about
their work could be included in thinking about the patient’s
insight. Understanding how insight is or could be influenced by
them is important. It has the potential to put the patient on a
more equal footing in their relationship with the clinicians and
remove the root of insight’s relation to compliance.
In the following, we summarize a vignette from Christopher
Bollas’s book “When the Sun Bursts: The Enigma of Schizophrenia”
(46). Bollas does not speak about insight directly, but the vignette
nonetheless illustrates how insight can be supported when
compliance is removed from the relationship.
Bollas describes his patient, “Lucy,” whom he worked with on
the phone five times per week for several years. Lucy had an abusive
childhood and bad experiences in younger adulthood. At the age of
55, she now leads a lonely, highly regulated life on a remote island in
the North. She presents with hallucinations and confusion, mixing
facts from her daily life with Nordic myths of her cultural
background. For several years, Lucy uses her sessions to recount
bad memories from her time living in a commune, but is not able to
own her own narrative moments later and accuses the therapist of
making things up if he tries to discuss the difficult events. Only after
several years, she is able to own her recollections.
Bollas focuses his account on an episode when Lucy
hallucinates a dragon that came to kill her as a punishment for
something. On the phone to her therapist, Lucy runs around
shouting “Go away. I did not do it. Please leave me alone” [(46)
p. 192].
What is Bollas’s reaction to Lucy’s hallucination? Recalling that
he has earlier mentioned to Lucy how good it was that her bad
memories were not “dragging on” anymore, he puts it to her
whether this might have brought an image of a dragon to her
mind. At first, Lucy is furious that she is not believed the dragon is
real. But the next day, she accuses him of having summoned the
dragon. This interpretation is still based on a persecutory anxiety
—”You said, ‘Your dragon will get you.’” [(46) p. 193]—but it
signals that something from his suggestion has sank in: that dragon
may have been conjured by something he had said. It is perhaps the
first step to her feeling that dragon can be “controlled” by someone.
The two are then able to consider together a few thoughts in
relation to the dragon: one is, that perhaps Lucy felt her therapist
thought she was a drag. This made her angry, which felt to her
like fire is coming out of her mouth, conjuring the image of a
dragon. It helped Lucy that they were able to discuss her feelings.
Another thought they consider is that the therapist was
“dragging on” about things more than she could take, and
thus, she was right to be upset. This acknowledgment helped
Lucy, too: that the therapist was self-reflexive about his own
probing questions having gone too far; that despite this probing
being part of “his job,” it matters how it is done and sometimes
he does not “get things right” [(46) p. 194], which also has a
direct role in Lucy’s experiences. In other words, for probing
questions it matters that there is in a mutual rather than
asymmetrical compliance-expecting relationship: self-reflexivity
from the patient needs to be matched by one from the therapist.September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560039
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experiences that he could use to reach her: as tools for his
insight into her state of mind, which then helped him support
her insight into her experience. He took the content of the
hallucinations and their accompanying feelings as prima-facie
valid and looked for the “reasoning” behind experiencing certain
feelings that culminated in the image of a dragon. This allowed
the two of them to together gain an understanding of her inner
life (insight) and for her to let go of the image.
After five years of analysis, Lucy was no longer hallucinating.
Slowly, the objects in her internal world could be distinguished
from the real object world, which instead “had become its own
thing, not subject to anyone’s narration” [(46) p. 196]. Her
experience of external reality could become close to the
therapist’s one.
If we compare this to a conception of insight where the clinician
insists that Lucy acknowledges that the dragon is simply not real,
recognizes it as a pathological symptom, which she needs to
attribute to her mental illness (schizophrenia) and take
medication to get rid of it, is that the only “insight” that can be
considered valid and appropriate in how she related to her
experiences? Is the only “insight” one is allowed about one’s
difficult experiences, a medical one?
We find that a striking and uncomfortable suggestion. Lucy
was able to, with support, reflect on and process her experiences.
The existing insight tools would arguably not appropriately
recognize this. Approaching her with expectations that she
acknowledges her experiences as symptoms and illness might
even inhibit rather than support this ability in her case.
It seems hard to imagine within psychiatric discourse that the
question of insight of someone who is, for example, talking about
being a “victim of conspiracy to rob them of their freedom” [(2) p.
1], or, for that matter, seeing dragons trying to kill them, can be
approached differently: without reference to whether they believe
they are ill, or even whether their experiences track reality
accurately, but with references to whether they are able to, at least
with support, relate to their experiences in a self-reflexive way.
Approaching the question of insight differently would also mean
exploring how both parties, as well as their wider socio-cultural
contexts, have had a role in the mental constructions emerging, and
that this can be used to help understand the patient. More
importantly still, that this can be used for the patients to
understand themselves better, to gain better insight into their
own experiences.
In turn, it is then hard to imagine within psychiatric discourse
that someone who does not believe they are ill in compliance with
the medical model, could “use and weigh” the proposed treatment
appropriately to make a decision for themselves (2).
In the discourse, focused on treatment solutions, risk
assessments, and planning, it is a challenging thought that all
communication, including the one taking place in assessment of
insight, might be multi-layered, always doing more than what is
being exchanged on the surface, and always developing in the
interaction. The way to health for someone like Lucy within
psychiatric views on insight seems to be restricted to continuous
evaluations of whether what she experiences matches theFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 12reality of others (and particularly a set of them, trained in the
psychiatric model).
In their response to Guidry-Grimes’s paper raising ethical
concerns around the use and conceptualizations of insight (5),
David and Ariyo (3) argue that views that question insight within
perspectives of ethics, philosophy, autonomy, and similar, should
be distinguished from understanding insight as a phenomenon.
About the latter, academics, “predisposed to question if not
dispute relevant evidence and facts,” can be reassured with
confidence that all the relevant systematic reviews and meta-
analyses, dozens of studies on thousands of participants have
been done. The relevant conclusions about clinical insight are “as
close to being ‘facts’ as anything else in the clinical psychiatry”
[(3) p. 1].
This view neglects the knowledge that these perspectives have
brought in the last three decades about how people function and
experience themselves. One’s experiences and one’s understanding
of them, including self-knowledge, and self-reflexivity are
continuously co-constructed, in any moment within real complex
relationships and multiple social networks (50–52). This means that
others are a fundamental dynamic part of how someone’s insight
about these experiences is continually created. Of particular
importance to these views is also an inclusion of temporality in
understanding of a person, both in the sense that an one’s personal
history has started to be understood as inherent in thinking about
one’s autonomy, as well as that a person continues to be formed
through relationships [(53) p. 115]. It is real relationships, histories,
and socio-cultural contexts that can, when things go wrong, give rise
to certain features of mental illness (54).
If a person’s experiences, including reflecting on themselves, are
continuously formed through complex relational dynamics and
through endless and changing discourses of power (55), then it is
counterproductive to measure insight in a context permeated by
requirements of compliance or as a trait of one separate individual.
It is not established that the medical conceptualization is always
the most helpful one before there is data in the studies on insight
about, for example, the patients’ views of their relationship with the
clinician, clinicians’ reflections on where they might have got some
of their treatments wrong, insight being recognized in views
different from the medical one. It is thus reassuring that both, the
perspectives of ethics and autonomy as well as psychiatric research
understand that insight is a “biopsychosocial construct par
excellence” [(2) p. 3]. This means that the psycho-social parts (the
content of hallucinations, the socio-economic conditions correlated
to particular “symptoms,” the correlation of insight to how
the patient views her relationship to her clinician, etc.) need
to be systematically and consistently included in insight
conceptualizations and studies.
In sum, insight, particularly when understood in the broad
sense as self-knowledge, has a social, relational dimension. For
self-knowledge one more often than not does need help from
others, in the sense of reference points and understanding. This
help needs to be supportive, exploratory, and including self-
reflectivity on both sides; and not imposing of one, medical, view.
Even if often “[a]cknowledging that one is ill or impaired or in
need of help… is necessary for living an authentic life” [(3) p. 2],September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560039
Curk et al. Removing Compliancesometimes, for living an authentic life, one first needs that
someone else engages with the “reality” of their dragons and
helps them to understand how and why they may have emerged,
rather than focus on the divergence in their respective forms
of “reality”.
Insight is an interesting and useful concept in care contexts,
because it is about self-knowledge and self-reflexivity as
communicated to others. It is an essential tool to help the
clinician understand how the other person thinks, feels, and
experiences things. It is essential in devising support. As Guidry-
Grimes argues, it should go beyond standard biomedical views of
the patient’s condition (5). We have suggested that it is a
profoundly relational, dynamically negotiated understanding of
one’s own experience, where the particular relationship to the
clinician is a variable affecting it through their interactions. The
way this happens, in all the mechanisms the mind uses such as
metaphors, associations, and emotions in relation to the
clinician, can be part of understanding insight.
We emphasize support as the right comportment in engaging
with the efforts to gain insight. In part, this is motivated by
considerations about what is best for the care of the individuals
in question. But it is also motivated by concerns with human
rights. The CRPD has been interpreted by its UN Committee and
many others as requiring a shift from the substituted decision-
making framework of best interest decisions to one of supported
decision-making (56–60), whereby all people are recognized
both, as needing support, even those who do not have any
disabilities, and as agents with full legal capacity, including
those with the most severe mental (or physical) illnesses and
impairments. Indeed, a groundbreaking 2017 report on mental
health issued by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the right to
health calls for a path of progressive realization, at the end of
which there would be no more involuntary assessment and
treatment (44). The broad notion of insight (as self-knowledge)
would still have a role to play at the end of this development and
shifting to it and to supporting it would help move us along the
path towards this end goal.GUIDELINES FOR INSIGHT
ASSESSMENTS
Insight assessment scales are mainly used in research rather than
in clinical practice, but they influence the diagnostic guidelines,
clinicians’ views on patients’ insight, and ensuing clinical
approaches to their treatment, as well as their giving evidence
in courts and tribunals.
This paper showed that expectations of compliance with
treatment, clinical discourse, as well as with the procedure,
context, and relationships permeate insight assessments and
conceptualizations. It showed that psychiatric approaches to
insight, despite a seeming variety in the field, circumscribe
insight, ultimately, to medical understanding of the experiences
in question. It demonstrated how this can be problematic both
(a) in terms of ethics and human rights requirements and (b)
counterproductive in producing self-knowledge. It has shownFrontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 13how someone’s insight is continuously affected by the relational
dynamics, which means that the context of compliance and
power asymmetry inherent in the standard insight assessment
setting are particularly adversarial to supporting someone to
gain insight into their experiences.
The sections above have aimed to establish that insight
assessment should be with the aim and in service of supporting
individuals in developing better insight into their experiences,
difficulties, and needs. The insight assessment procedure
should consider insight’s social and relational dimensions to
identify how individuals can be thus supported, where this
should include building in mechanisms of self-reflexivity on
part of the assessors about these dimensions. The individual
assessed should be able to choose whether they want to be
assessed and by whom, and to change their assessor (ideally
within a pool of qualified, accredited assessors with a plurality
of views, who have been appropriately trained towards being
self-reflective, supporting someone’s self-reflexivity/self-
knowledge and, most importantly, doing so without undue
influence), or quit the assessment process.
These requirements are meant to recognize that insight is a
continuing process of developing an understanding of one’s
experiences and is a profoundly relational phenomenon,
embedded in personal and socio-cultural contexts. In our view,
considering a person’s insight, is essentially trying to understand,“How does this person think about and understand
her experiences, and how is my relationship to them
affecting this experience and understanding, and my
assessment of it?”Answering this question adequately involves a lot of
knowledge about each other.
What does this mean for research on insight, since researchers
presumably cannot establish such an alliance with their participants
during the short time of the research study? We think it could be
based on observational studies of the clinicians-patients’
relationships in practice, observing how they make sense of
experiences together. Researchers could help create methods to
support clinicians’ self-reflexivity and making more explicit their
background thinking when assessing their patients. Studies would
also need to be based on participatory research to help establish
what good and bad practices are when assessing insight.
Based on these reflections, human rights-compliant
guidelines for the practitioner to rely on in this exploration
would need to consider the following points:
1. Scope and aim:
a. Insight assessment should be based on the broad
notion of insight (insight as self-knowledge).
b. Insight assessment should be applicable to everyone,
not presuppose the assessed person is mentally ill but
just explore their experiences.
c. Insight assessment should be undertaken with the aim
and in service of empowering and supporting the
person to exercise their right to self-determination
and better understand their needs and experiences.September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560039
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Frontierd. The assessment should be orientated towards exploring
what explanatory models the person has, how they may
have been influenced by various psycho-social factors,
and how they can be deployed to support the person’s
understanding or ameliorate potential risks, rather
than measuring compliance with the medical model
of psychiatry.
e. It should allow that when someone does not agree with
the specific diagnosis or treatment or the medical
model of psychiatry, they might still have insight.2. Socio-cultural background:
a. The individual’s socio-cultural background and
experiences should be considered.
b. Assessors should note the socio-cultural distance
between themselves and the individuals assessed, and
guard against potential biases, including by being self-
reflexive about this distance and its impact on the mode
of engagement and conclusions drawn.3. Therapeutic alliance:
a. The assessment should be conducted within a self-
chosen therapeutic relationship that the individual
considers understanding and supportive. This should
include the right to change the assessor and quit the
assessment process.
b. Individual’s personal circumstances, protection from
social stigma, or impact on self-identity should be
taken into account when assessing insight. Assessors
should be mindful of the difficulty to own up publicly
to a connection between one’s experiences and medical
descriptions and labels.
c. Insight assessment should never constitute undue
influence on the person’s responses. Assessors shoulds in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 14be self-reflexive about how their mode of engagement
might make insight-qua-self-knowledge more difficult
to achieve and change up their mode of engagement
accordingly.
d. Research into insight should take into account the
whole relationship, rather than focusing solely on the
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44. Pūras D. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
A/HRC/35/21. (2017). Available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/G17/076/04/PDF/G.Frontiers in Psychiatry | www.frontiersin.org 1545. McCabe R, Joh P, Dooley J, Healey P, Cushing A, Kingdon D, et al. Training to
enhance psychiatrist communication with patients with psychosis (TEMPO):
cluster randomised controlled trial. Br J Psychiatry (2016) 209:517–24. doi:
10.1192/bjp.bp.115.179499
46. Bollas C. When the Sun Bursts: The Enigma of Schizophrenia. Yale University
Press: London (2015).
47. Davoine F, Gaudilliere J-M. History Beyond Trauma. Other Press: New York
(2004).
48. Misdrahi D, Petit M, Blanc O, Bayle F, Llorca P M. The influence of
therapeutic alliance and insight on medication adherence in schizophrenia.
Nordic J Psychiatry (2012) 66:49–54. doi: 10.3109/08039488.2011.598556
49. Karow A, Pajonk FG, Reimer F, Hirdes A, Osterwald C, Naber D. The
dilemma of insight into illness in schizophrenia: self- and expert-rated insight
and quality of life. Eur Arch Psychiatry Clin Neurosci (2008) 258, 152–9. doi:
10.1007/s00406-007-0768-5
50. Mackenzie C, Stoljar N eds. Relational Autonomy. Feminist Perspectives on
Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self. Oxford University Press.: New York
and Oxford (2000).
51. Anderson PS. Autonomy, Vulnerability and Gender. Feminist Theory (2003)
4:149–64. doi: 10.1177/14647001030042004
52. Tronto J. Time’s place. Feminist Theory (2003) 4:119–38. doi: 10.1177/
14647001030042002
53. Roseneil S, Hogan L. Ethical Relations - Agency, Autonomy, Care. Feminist
Theory (2003) 4:115–7. doi: 10.1177/14647001030042001
54. Johnstone L, Boyle M, Cromby J, Dillon J, Harper D, Kinderman P, et al. The
Power Threat Meaning Framework. British Psychological Society: Leicester
(2018).
55. Butler J. The psychic life of power. Theories in subjection. Stanford University
Press: Stanford, California (1997).
56. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. General comment
No 1 (2014) Article 12: Equal recognition before the law. CRPD/C/GC/1.
(2014). Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/crpd/pages/gc.
aspx.
57. Dhanda A. Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold
of the Past or Lodestar for the Future. Syracuse J Int Law & Commerce (2007)
34:429–62.
58. Quinn G, Arstein-Kerslake A. Restoring the “human” in “human rights”:
personhood and doctrinal innovation in the UN disability convention. In:
Gearty C, Douzinas C, editors. The Cambridge Companion to Human Rights
Law. Cambridge University Press (2012).
59. Richardson G. Mental Disabilities and the Law: From Substituted to
Supported Decision-Making? Curr Legal Probl (2012) 65:333–54.
doi: 10.1093/clp/cus010
60. Flynn E, Arstein-Kerslake A. Legislating personhood: realising the right to
support in exercising legal capacity. Int J Law Context (2014) 10:81–104.
doi: 10.1017/S1744552313000384
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2020 Curk, Gurbai and Freyenhagen. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY).
The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No
use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.September 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 560039
